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) 
(S. F. No. 18997. In Bank. July 13. 1954.J 
BERTHA KESLER et aI., Appellants, v. FRED W. PABST. 
Respondent. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Damages for Per-
sonal Injury.-In absence of agreement to contrary, a cause 
of action for injuries to either husband or wife arising during 
marriage and while they are living together is community 
property, and it is ordinarily necessary to imp~ negligence 
of one spouse to the other to prevent negligent spouse from 
profiting by his own wrong. 
[2] Id.-Aetions-Defenses-Husband's Contributory Negligence. 
-Where husband and wife sustained injuries in collision of 
vehicles, husband's act, subsequent to accident, in executing 
written agreement relinquishing to wife his interest in her 
cause of action for injuries is an attempt to exercise control 
over his interest in community cause of action and cannot 
avoid effect of his contributory negligence and thus create an 
enforceable right in his donee that did not theretofore exist. 
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Community Property, §§ 31, 32; Am.Jur .• 
Community Property, § 36. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 65(1); [2, 51 
Husband and Wife, § 189(1); [3, 4] Husband and Wife, 1185(2). 
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LS] Id.-Actions-For Injuries to Wife. II \tholl;..:h wi fe'R Mllse of 
action fl)r perRonnl injnrif'R is cOllllllunity pro[lf'l"ty, she was a 
necessary party to action even before Code Civ. Proe., § 370, 
was enacted in 1913 to allow her to sue alone, this rule having 
been adopted at common law to prevent cause of action for 
wife's injuries from abating on husband's death. 
[4] Id.-Actions-For Injuries to Wife.-Since on husband's death, 
wife's entire cause of action for personal injuries survives to 
her by operation of law, husband cannot, either by exercisins; 
or failing to exercise his power of testamentary disposition 
over half of community property, affect his wife's rights in 
her cause of action, and he is not unjustly enriched by allowing 
his wife her full recovery. 
[6] Id. - Actions - Defenses - Husband's Contributory Negli-
gence.-Where wife did not secure entire interest in her cause 
of action for personal injuries by occurrence of events beyond 
her husband's control, but secured it, if at all, only because 
he voluntarily relinquished it to her, reason for rule imputing 
his negligence to her has not ceased to exist, and he is unjustly 
enriched by allowing his wife her full recovery. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County. Murray Draper, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Action by husband and wife for damages for personal in-
juries arising out of collision of vehieles. Judgment for de-
fendant affirmed. 
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TRA YNOIt, ,J.. Oil th~ evenillg .. r .J Illy II, l!J::iU, plaintiffs, 
Mr. and Mrs. Kesler. were in.iured in a collision with defend-
ant's automobile, wlo·'.J ~I r. Kesler attempted to drive his car 
across Bayshore Highway at the Cypress A ,'enne intersection 
in San Mateo County. Plaintiffs brought this action to re-
cover for their personal injuries and for property damage 
to the automobile. Defendant denied that he was negligent 
and pleaded contributory negligence of Mr. Kesler. The jury 
returned a verdict for defendant. and judgment was entered 
accordingly. A motion by Mrs. Kesler for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on the issue of liability in her favor was 
denied, and plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment and 
from the order denying Mrs. Kesler's motion. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the evidence is insufficient 
to support a finding that Mr. Kesler was contributively negli-
gent. Mrs, Kesler contends, however, that the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury that contributory negligence of 
her husband would be imputed to her and bar her recovery. 
She bases this contention on a written instrument, executed . 
after the accident, by which her husband relinquished to her 
his interest in her cause of action. She points out that accord-
ing to the terms of the agreement, her cause of action became 
her separate property and that therefore her husband wotdd 
not be unjustly enriched by her recovery, as he would had 
the cause of action remained community property. 
In Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622 [248 P.2d 922], the 
question was presented whether the husband's death prevented 
the imputation of his contributory negligence to his wife in 
an action for her injuries and for the wrongful death of the 
minor child of the parties. It was held that the husband's 
negligence did not bar his wife's recovery. [1] "In the absence 
of an agreement to the contrary, it is settled that a cause 
of action for injuries to either the husband or the wife arising 
during the marriage and while they are living together is 
community property [citations], and the same rule is appli-
cable to a cause of aetion for the wrongful death of a minor 
ehild. or for damages suffered by the parents because of 
injury to such a child. [Citations.] Accordingly, in all of 
these situations it is ordinarily necessary to impute the negli-
gence of one spouse to the other to prevent the negligent 
!>;pOllse from profiting by his own wrong. [Citations. I When 
thl' marriage is dissolved. however, the interests in any of 
tht'~C' ('I'lll!'1C'!>; of adion h(,('OlHl' !'1l'flarate propc'rt.y. and it bC'-
CUUlt:S possilJle to segl"~gate theeleweuts of damagc·s that 
I 
! 
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would, eXt'('pt for HIl' \'0111111111111,\ PI'''I",'I'I.\" ",\ ,,11'111, In' t'''JI!.;itl 
('red personal to ('ac'" ~Pllll~l', I ;lIdl'l' 11t('~(' "iI"C'lIll!statH:CS the 
objective of prcvclItil1;,{ unjust enril'!lIn1'nt may be accom-
plished by barring only the interest of the negligent spouse 
or his estate." (39 Cal.2d at 630-631,) In the present case 
the pivotal question is whether this objective may also be 
achieved by an agreement between the spouses executed after 
the cause of action has accrued by which they purport to con-
vert a commnnity cause of aetion into the separate property 
of the injured spouse. 
It is unnecessary to determine whether the general rule of ; 
non assignability of causes of action for personal injuries ren- " 
ders ineffective a purported relinquishment of an interest in 
such a cause of action executed after the cause of action has 
arisen. (See Perkins v. Sunset Tel. d7 Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712, 
719-721 [103 P. 190].) [2] Even if it is assumed that such 
a relinquishment is effective behvcen the spouses, its execution 
does not prevent the negligent husband from profiting by his 
own wrong. By his act of relinquishment Mr. Kesler sought 
to exercise control over his interest in the community cause i 
of action and give up his rights in the recovery. The right' 
to dispose of property. howeyer, constitutes a major interest! 
of the owner therein, and if by the exercise of such right the ' 
o\vner could avoid the effect of his contributory negligence 
and thus create an enforceable right in his donee that did not 
.theretofore exist. he would in fact profit by his own wrong. 
Accordingly, the objective of preyenting unjust enrichment 
cannot be accomplished by a voluntary relinquishment of the 
negligent husband's interest to his wife. 
It is contended, however. that the logical consequence of 
the holding in Flores v. Brown, supra, is that a negligent 
husband is not unjustly enriched by his wife's recovery after 
he has relinquished his interest in her cause of action to her. 
In support of this contention it is urged that in that case 
the wife was allowed to recover for all of the damages suffered 
by her. although her husband's interest must have passed 
through his estate to her on his death. The argument con-
clndes that since no unjust enrichment resulted in that case 
by permitting the husband's interest to pass to his wife through 
his estate, no unjust enrichment would result by allowing 
him to give his int{'rest to her directly. This contention over-
looks the peculiar character of the wife's cause of action for 
personal injuries. [3] Although it was determined in Me-
43 C.2d-1 
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Faddr.n v. l~(11lf" Ana etc. (Jo., 87 Cn!. 461 [2;' P. 681, 11 
IJ.R.A. ~:i2J. that Ihl' wife's ('nll~f' of action is community 
property, it relllained the settlpd law, cven beforc section 370 
of the Code of Civil Procedure was al\1pndcd in 1!)13 to allow 
the wife to suc alone, that the wife was a necessary part.,· 
to the action. (Moody v. Southern Pac. Co., 167 Cal. 786. 
790-791 [141 P. 3ti8J.) As was pointed out in the Muody 
('ase this rule was adopted at common law to prevent tl\(' 
{'allse of action for the wife's injurirs from abatillg on her 
husband's death. (S~·t' aliio Fink \'. Campbeli. 70 1<'. 664. 
G67 [17 C,C.A. 325]; Fowler v. Frisbie, 3 Conn. 320, 324; 
Fuller v. Naugat1tck Railroad Co., 21 Conn. 557, 573-574: 
Church v. Tow·n of lVesiminster, 45 Vt. 380. 38:>; Horandt 
v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 78 N.J.L. 190 [73 Atl. 93, 96].) 
"Although at common law the cause of action f(lr the wife's 
suffering was the separate property of the husband. it was 
settled that the wife was a necessary party to the suit, the 
reasoning being that. as the authorities express it, she was 
the • meritorious cause of action,' and that in case of his death 
pending suit the cause of action ,,'ould survive to her. 
The proposition that, although the right of action is commu-
nity property, yet the wife is a necessary party in this par- , 
ticular class of cases, is no more illogical than the rule at 
common law that the wife must join though the right was 
thc separate property of the hnsband. The reasons for the 
decisions under the common law are applicable to the case 
where the right is community property, as fully and com-
pletely as to the case where it is the husband's separate prop-
erty." (Moody v. Southern Pac. Co., supra. 167 Cal. 786, 
790-791 [141 P. 388].) [4] Thus, since on her husband's 
death, the wife's entire cause of action survives to her by oper-
ation of law, the husband cannot, either by exercising or failing 
to exercise his power of testamental'Y disposition over half 
of the community property, affect his wife's rights in her 
cause of action. Accordingly, he is not unjustly enriched by 
allowing his wife her full recovery. [5] In the present case. 
011 the other hand, Mrs. Kesler did not secure the entire inter· 
!';:t in her cause of action by the occurrence of events beyol1(\ 
h"r husband's control; she secured it. if nt all. only because he 
\'oluntarily relinquished it to her, and a('corllingly, the reason 
rot· the rule imputing his negligence to her has not ceased to 
f·xist. 
Amiei ('\Jriai~ contend that to thl' extrnt that the wiff' has 
1..H'l'U given the management and control of the dUllIag!'s I'e-
J n)y 1%4] KESLER V. PAflST 
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!'o\'cred Ly her for her persona) injuries by lSedi"lI !'i !.:" of 
the Civil Coue, the husbanu's interest therein has IJl"'()1l1e so 
attclIlIrl ted that it should not be consillercd snffieiell t to j llstlfy 
imputing his negligence to her. In the light of thi:; statuti!I'Y 
ehllnge, It is contended that the evil of permitting the negli-
gent defcndllnt to escape liability is no longer outweighed 
by the bendits the negl i;!ent spouse might secure by his own 
\\Tong. (See Plores v. BI'own, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 622. 632.) 
In tli I~ connection it is pointed out that the older cases ill 
",hieh the wife's negligence was imputed to her husband were 
dl'eiued primarily 011 an agency theory, and not on the theory 
tllat the wife's nonmanagerial interest in the community prop-
erty was sufficient to justify imputing negligence to prevent 
IH'l' from profiting by her own wrong. (See opinion on denial 
of hearing by the Supreme Court in Keena v. United RaIlroads 
of S. F., 57 Cal.App. 124,132 [207 P. 35).) Since it is now 
settled that the family relationship standing alone is not suffi-
cient to convert family activities into joint enterprises, or to 
make one spouse the agent of the other, for purposes of 
imputing negligence (Flores v. Brown, supra, 39 Cal.2d 622, 
630, and cases cited), it is contended that the entire doctrine 
of implited negligence between spouses should be re-examined 
in the light of the statutory change with respect to the right 
of management and control of damages recoverable for per-
sonal injuries. In the present case, however, the cause of 
action arose before section 171c was added to the Civil Code 
in 1931, and at a time when Mr. Kesler was entitled to the 
management and control of any damages his wife might re-
cover. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to decide at this time 
." Notwithstanding the provisions ot Section 161a and 172 of this 
code, and subject to the provisions of Sections 164 and 169 of this code, 
the wife has the management, control and disposition, other than testa· 
mentary except as otherwise permitted by law, of community property 
money earned by her, or community property money damages received 
by her for personal in.juries suffered by her, until it is commingled with 
other community property. except that the husb:md shall hHe manage-
ment, control, and disposition of such money damages to the extent 
necessary to pay for expenses incurred by reason of the wife '8 personal 
injuries . 
•• During such time as the wife may have the management. control 
and disposition of such money, as herein provided, she may not make 
a gift thereof, or dispose of tile same without a valuable consideration, 
without thc written COil sent of the husband . 
•• This 8",·tion sh:lll not be construed as making SUl'l1 money the sep 
arate property of the wife, nor as changing the Tl'spcctjYe int~I'e3tll of 
the husimnd and wife in such money, as defined in Section 161a of 
this e"dc.' I 
~(jl) KESLER V. PABtiT l4:-l C.2d 
what ('(fret, if any, s(,etion 17le Illay have on thr rule' of 
ililPuting eOlltributory nrgJigrnr'1' bl'twecn hllsballrl and wifr. 
PlantiiTs t'ontt'nd thRt tlw trial "Ol1r! rrrrd in l"'f;lsing to 
gi,'c certain instructions ofi'el'r(l by thenl. Wr have carefully 
t'xaminrd all of the illstructions and hayc coneludrd that the 
trial ('ourt correctly rletrrmined that the substant'€' of all of 
the requested instructions was adequately covered by the in-
structions that were given. 
The jndgment and the order are affirmed. 
Shenk, Acting C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and Peek, .J. pro tern.,· concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that a cause of action in the wife for her 
personal injuries is a "community cause of action." As I 
pointed out in my dissent in Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Ca1.2d 
315, 325, et seq. [202 P.2d 73), the wife has a right to sue 
alone for her personal injuries (Code Civ. Proc., § 370; San-
derson v. Niemann, 17 Ca1.2d 563, 567 [110 P.2d 1025]), and 
the recovery therefor should be her sole and separate prop-
erty (William Quinby de Funiak, Principles of Community 
Property, pp. 225, 231, 232; 24 CaLL.Rev. 739, 741: Rest. 
Torts, § 487). 
In the Zaragosa case I pointed out that since the 1921 
amendment to section 370 of the Code of Civil Prot't'uure. 
a married woman may sue without her husband being joined 
as a party in all actions" ... including those for in.fury to 
her person . ... " and that any recovery received hy her 
ghould, logically. be her separate and personal property. This 
court, however, continues to hold, without due considf'ration, 
that the canse of action for the wife's personal injuries is a 
community cause of action and that any recovery therefor 
should also be community property. This holding, carried to 
its illogical conclusion, prevents the injured. wholly innocent. 
wife from recovering a sinf!le cent if her husband was guilty 
of contributory negligence. To hold that since the wife 
may sue alone for her personal injuries any recovery therefor 
would be her separate property ".-anld not constitnte jndicial 
It'gislation bnt wO\1ld bl', merely, a reasonable intl'rpretation 
t)f the statutes in the light of everyday common sense. Th<' 
(lilly reason given for barring th(' injnred wife of a contribn· 
• A88igned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
